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Case Review Essay

Baby M, the Surrogacy
Contract, and the Health Care
Professional:
Unanswered Questions
Karen H. Rothenberg

The Baby M case 1 has forced us to
take sides in the public debate over
surrogate motherhood. Last year,
advocates of this form of noncoital
reproduction praised the New Jersey
trial court 2 for supporting the freedom to contract for such "womb
renting" services, while critics
warned that enforcement of such
surrogacy contracts would condone
the sale of babies and the exploitation of women as baby factories. In
its unanimous opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court sided with the
critics. 3 Based on New Jersey's
adoption law and public policy, the
court refused to enforce the contract
that provided money to a surrogate
mother in return for her agreeing to
be artificially inseminated with the
semen of another woman's husband,
to conceive a child, to carry it to
term, and to relinquish her parental
rights and surrender her child to the
natural father and his wife, regardless of the child's best interests. The
court believed that its "declaration
that this surrogacy contract is unenforceable and illegal is sufficient to
deter similar agreements." 4
The court was particularly offended by the payment of money in
exchange for bearing and relinquishing a baby. "There are," it said, "in

a civilized society, some things that
money cannot buy." 5 Payment of
money to the surrogate was "illegal,
perhaps criminal, and degrading to
women." 6 The court found "no
offense" to present laws where a
woman serves as a surrogate without payment, provided she is not
subject to a binding agreement to
surrender her child. 7 Nor did it preclude the legislature from altering
the statutory scheme to permit surrogacy contracts, within constitutional limits-limits that the court
did not define and that are not easily
definable.
The court concluded its ninetyfive-page opinion with a prediction-and perhaps a hope for the future:
Legislative consideration of surrogacy may also provide the
opportunity to begin to focus
on the overall implications of
the new reproductive biotechnology .... The problem can be
addressed only when society
decides what its value and objectives are in this troubling, yet
promising, area. 8
Perhaps this is why legislatures
have had so much trouble passing
laws in this area. Although bills have

been introduced in the majority of
states, as well as Congress, to either
ban or regulate surrogacy, most
have died in committee. The Baby M
decision, however, has stimulated
debate and has influenced the direction of recent legislation. New Jersey's Supreme Court is well respected nationwide for its leadership
in analyzing complex ethical issues.
What impact will its analysis have
on those states where surrogacy contracts will continue to be written in a
legal wasteland? For couples desperate to have':a child, for women desperate for money, and for brokers
desperate to get rich, the risks may
still be worth taking.
But what about the role of the
health professional in the surrogacy
process? What issues have been clarified by the Baby M decision and the
surrogacy contract? What questions
still remain unanswered? And, what
new questions have been raised?
To put such questions in some
context, it is worth noting that nineteen amicus briefs were filed with
the New Jersey Supreme Court in
this case, expressing various interests and views on surrogacy. In fact,
the court specifically acknowledged
that many of them were helpful in
resolving the issues. 9 Yet not one
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brief was filed on behalf of a healthprofessional association. One can
only speculate that such groups did
not view the Baby M case as a relevant case of nationwide importance
and/or that they had not officially
considered their positions on surrogacy. Not one of the major mental
health associations, including the
American Psychological Association
and the American Psychiatric Association, had officially considered the
issue. In fact, very little evidence has
appeared in any of the scientific
journals on surrogacy. Either the
Baby M decision will increase demand for evidence on the effects of
surrogacy or it will dry up interest.
Or, perhaps, the issue is just too
controversial for health-professional
groups struggling for consensus.
Yet as early as 1983, the Judicial
Council of the American Medical
Association (AMA) and the Executive Board of the American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecology
(ACOG) issued policy statements on
surrogacy.
As late as September
1987, the ~-\..c'viA affirmed its opposition to surrogacy to the Drafting
Committee on the "Status of Children of the New Biology" of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws: "Surrogate
parent contracts do not represent a
satisfactory reproductive alternative
for those who wish to become
parents." 11 The AMA opposed state
legislation to sanction such arrangements.
Although ACOG is reevaluating
its position in light of the Baby M
decision, its present ethical guidelines do not condemn the practice.
They do, however, express "significant reservations about this approach to parenthood." Of particular concern is the difficulty of differentiating between payments for the
service of carrying the child and the
payment for the child itself-clearly
a practice that is "illegal and morally objectionable." ACOG also
warns against investing in surrogacy
businesses or accepting money for
10

recruiting or referring potential surrogates. The physician "should not
participate in a surrogate program
where the financial arrangements
are likely to exploit any of the
parties." Yet in the end, the decision
about whether to participate in a
surrogacy arrangement is left up to
the physician. Such a decision
should be made only after the physician has weighed all the "legal,
psychological, societal, medical and
ethical aspects." 12
In 1986, the Ethics Committee of
the American Fertility Society issued
its report on "Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive
Technologies."' 3 The committee
concluded that if surrogate motherhood is pursued, it should be as a
"clinical experiment." 14 Unfortunately, this experiment will not answer the current concerns about the
enforceability of the surrogate contract and the custody of the child. In
fact, a few members of the committee questioned whether, given the
small number of couples involved, it
was likely that significant research
would be performed. Others would
not endorse a procedure that was so
highly controversial and whose
risk-benefit ratio did not justify
support. 15
In spite of the fact that these
groups did not play an active role in
the Baby M appeal, the court's decision and its potential impact on the
surrogacy contract continue to raise
a number of unanswered questions
for the health care professional. Will
participation in such arrangements
carry a taint of immorality-and
perhaps a threat of criminality? Will
exposure to professional liability increase with more demand for screening, counseling, and evaluation?
Will future regulation place health
care professionals in the role of
"guarantors" of the agreement? At
various stages of the surrogacy process, the professional is faced with a
number of complex questions, many
with no answers. By examining the
Baby M case and its surrogacy con114

tract, this article highlights these unanswered questions and the implications for health care professionals.
The "Perhaps Criminal" Role
The Baby M case was a dispute
about a contract and the custody of
Baby M, not about criminal liability.
Yet the court stated, albeit in dictum, that the surrogate arrangement
was "perhaps criminal" under New
Jersey law. 16 What are the implications of this confusing phrase?
New Jersey law prohibits the use
of money in connection with adoptions. Violation of this "baby
selling" law is a high misdemeanor,
a third-degree crime carrying a
three-to five-year prison term. 17 Excepted are fees of an approved
agency and payment or reimbursement for medical, hospital, or related expenses incurred in connection with the birth of the child. Although the Baby M contract
provided that the fees paid were for
services and expenses, the court concluded that the parties knew it was
nothing other than a privateplacement adoption for money. The
contract provided for "the sale of a
child, or at the very least, the sale of
a mother's right to her child, the
only mitigating factor being that one
of the purchas'e,rs is the father." 18
The court concluded that the
evils that prompted the prohibition
against the payment of money in
connection with adoption are present in the surrogacy arrangement. In
both cases, "the essential evil is the
same, taking advantage of the woman's circumstances (the unwanted
pregnancy or the need for money) in
order to take away the child." In the
court's view, it was the middleman-the surrogate brokermotivated by the profit motive, who
promotes the sale. The profit motive-and not the best interests of
the parties-"predominates, permeates, and ultimately governs the
transaction." 1 9
The court never mentioned the
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role of the health professional in the
context of the baby-selling prohibition. Yet the taint of immorality and
possible criminality permeates the
court's analysis. To date, twentyfour states have enacted laws prohibiting baby-selling. 20 If babyselling laws are interpreted to cover
the surrogacy arrangement, they
may be interpreted broadly enough
to subject a health care professional
to criminal liability for his or her
participation. 21 Moreover, since
Baby "\f was decided, at least five
states have passed statutes restricting commercial surrogacy. 22 The
Baby ~1 contract provided for artificial insemination, for a fee, by a
physician. The contract provided for
evaluation, for a fee, by a psychiatrist. The contract provided for the
inseminating physician, for a fee, to
make judgments about genetic testing. Health professionals legitimized
the "medical" aspects of the process.
By their actions, they sanctioned the
deal. Without the involvement of the
health care professionals, would the
surrogate arrangement be as profitable? Would it continue to be characterized as a reproductive "technology"? Does the participation of the
health care professional-although
not critical to the deal-contribute
to its success as a "medical" solution
to infertility? Unless the health care
professional also serves as a broker,
referral service, and/or owner of a
surrogacy agency, it is highly unlikely that there would be fair notice
under most existing state laws to be
criminally liable. 23 Yet the charge of
"aiding and abetting" a crime would
not be out of the question.
A more realistic fear for the
health care professional may be the
impact of characterizing the surrogacy process as immoral, illegal, and
"perhaps criminal." Will professionals want to take the risk? Will health
professionals disassociate themselves from surrogacy? At what
price? Criminalization of surrogacy
may drive the business underground, without sufficient quality

control. In the meantime, without
further legislative clarification, the
hint of potential criminality should
at least cause those professionals
participating in a surrogacy contract
to analyze their role throughout the
process. In the end, they may be
faced with even more unanswered
questions.
Pre-Insemination: Evaluation,
Counseling, and "Informed
Consent"
Contrary to all the protection provided for counseling prior to termination of parental rights, the court
found that the surrogacy contract
did not provide for "counseling, independent or otherwise, of the natural mother, no evaluation, no
warning." 24 The lack of counseling
and evaluation reinforced the
court's determination to void the
agreement.
Apparently the only psychological evaluation performed on Ms.
Whitehead took place almost two
years prior to her agreement with
Mr. Stern. According to the trial
court, Ms. Whitehead received a
"psychological evaluation to determine her suitability as a potential
surrogate candidate" at the Infertility Center of New York (ICNY). Although the "examiner" thought it
important to explore her ability to
relinquish the child in more depth,
she was recommended as an appropriate candidate. "It was this fact of
prior evaluation that the Stems relied on." 2 5 According to the trial
court, Ms. Whitehead also testified
that she received two counseling sessions at ICNY, a point ignored by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court raised a
number of concerns about the role
of evaluation and counseling. It
questioned whether the evaluation
served anyone but ICNY. 26 Nothing
in the record stated that the evaluation was for the surrogate's benefit.
To the contrary: Ms. Whitehead testified that all she was told was that

"she had passed." 27 The Sterns
never asked to see the evaluation.
They assumed that ICNY had made
an evaluation and "had concluded
that there was no danger that the surrogate would change her mind." 28
The court stressed the fact that a
psychologist had warned that Ms.
Whitehead demonstrated cer_tain
traits that "might make surrender of
the child difficult and that there
should be further inquiry." The
court speculated that to inquire further may have jeopardized the deal,
believing that the "profit motive got
the better" of ICNY. 29
The court ignored the provision
in the contract that specifically
stated that a "psychiatric" evaluation was to be arranged for both Mr.
and Ms. Whitehead, to be paid for
by Mr. Stern, and that the Whiteheads were to sign a release permitting dissemination of the evaluation
report to ICNY or the Sterns.3° Did
this evaluation ever take place as
provided in the contract? If so, what
were the results? Is this the evaluation the Supreme Court was describing? Or did the Sterns waive this
contract provision and rely on the
evaluation done almost two years
earlier by a clinical psychologist on
contract with ICNY?
The facts are not clear from the
record. What is clear is that the
court envisioned a process of both
evaluation and counseling. A more
in-depth evaluation would have focused on the likelihood of Ms.
Whitehead changing her mind,
while extensive counseling would
have alerted her to the potential impact of relinquishing her child.
Should the mental health professional be in a position to guarantee
that a mother won't change her
mind or that her consent is voluntary? Is this an assessment that the
court would agree was impossible
until after birth?3 1 How would the
professional make such assessments? What traits, in fact, should
the professional look for-stability,
pecuniary motives, detachment,
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sensitivity?3 2 Will the surrogate with
a detached personality have the easiest time relinquishing, but also be
most unconcerned during the pregnancy? Perhaps the most sensitive
person would feel a sense of duty to
the infertile couple and find it easiest
to relinquish a child. What was it
about Ms. Whitehead's personality
that caused doubt? Do psychologists
on contract with a surrogacy agency
ever recommend that a candidate
not be approved? If the initial evaluation raises questions, do you stop
there? Or should the mental health
professional re-evaluate following
counseling? Should counseling include surrogate "support groups" in
which the surrogate candidate can
minimize her feelings of doubt? And
how often should evaluations take
place? For example, would the Baby
M court require evaluation and
counseling each month prior to insemination?
The court speculated that if either the Sterns or Ms. Whitehead
had been told the details of the evaluation, the agreement would never
have been made. 33 The evaluation, if
shared, might have warned both
parties and put them on notice. The
court pointed out that both parties
suffered severe emotional distress,
which could have been avoided with
proper evaluation and full disclosure
and counseling. 34 Yet the contract
between Mr. Stern and ICNY made
it quite clear that ICNY would "not
guarantee or warrant" that the surrogate would comply, including, but
not limited to, her "refusal to surrender custody of the child upon
birth."35 Mr. Stern also specifically
released ICNY from any liability
"related to or arising from any
agreement or understanding between himself and a 'surrogate
mother' located through the services
of ICNY."3 6
The court questioned whether,
even with sufficient evaluation and
counseling, a surrogate could ever
grant "informed consent" to the
terms of the surrogate contract. Tra-

ditionally, informed consent requires that the patient be told of the
risks and benefits of the treatment
options. For the trial court, informed consent was defined as a
"concept used in the trial of medical
malpractice cases." The trial court
rejected Ms. Whitehead's argument
that until she "felt the emotion of
birth and sensed the child, she could
not give informed consent at the
time she signed the contract." To accept this expanded concept of informed consent would put "all contracts in limbo."37
On the contrary, the Supreme
Court was concerned not so much
with informed consent to a medical
procedure (the insemination procedure is a simple, non-material risk)
but, rather, with the consent to relinquish the baby at the time of signing the contract. The court embraced a broad definition of informed consent that is somewhat
foreign to contract law. A standard
contract requires only that both
parties are competent at the time
the agreement is made. In fact, the
contract stated that both parties
"freely and voluntarily" signed the
agreement. 38
Perhaps the court deemed it
"impossible" and/or "impracticable" for a natural mother to consent to relinquish her child until a
reasonable time after birth. Without
any scientific evidence cited, the
court took judicial notice that the
"natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the
strength of her bond with her child."
In the "most important sense" her
decision is "uninformed."39
As a practical matter, what
should the consent process include?
Is a health care professional qualified to disclose the medical, psychological, legal, and financial risks and
benefits of the surrogate contract?
How certain is any of this information? The medical risks associated
with insemination and pregnancy
are currently to be disclosed. But
what about the long-term psycho116

logical risks to the parties, their families, and the child? Furthermore, the
uncertainty of the legal and financial
issues clouds consent even more. At
best, "informed consent" will be a
warning to all potential parties
about all foreseeable risks.
Some states may attempt to regulate surrogacy by delineating standards for screening, evaluation,
counseling, and informed consent
prior to the signing of a contract.
For example, recent proposals require the surrogate and the natural
father to submit to physical and genetic screening. The surrogate may
also be required to undergo psychological evaluation to determine
whether any medical disability
would prevent her from abiding by
the terms of the contract. A few proposals require that a licensed marriage counselor, psychologist, or
psychiatrist certify that "the consequences and responsibilities of surrogate parenthood" were explained
to the natural father and his wife,
that "the surrogate had the capacity
to consent," and that "the potential
psychological consequence of her
consent" had been discussed. 40 Proposals in Connecticut and Hawaii,
for example, prohibit insemination
unless the "physician is professionally satisfied with the mental and
physical suitability of the surrogate
and the natural father."4 1
Such requirements seem to put
the health care professional in the
position of "guarantor" of the surrogacy process. Will professionals
have to guarantee or warrant that
the mother will not change her
mind, that the medical and genetic
makeup of all the parties proves acceptable, that the psychological
evaluation assures no problems, and
that the parties have been warned of
all risks?
Such attempts at regulation may
transform surrogacy from a commercial enterprise to a medically
controlled reproductive choice.
With more involvement of health
care professionals, will the surro-
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gacy process be legitimized? Is this a
role that health care professionals
want to accept? If so, who will monitor their compliance with the standards? Will such a role increase professional liability? What will the
standard of care be for assessing
their role in the pre-conception deal?
And what if the deal falls apart? The
legal and ethical risks should force
health care professionals to become
more involved in evaluating proposals for surrogacy regulation.
Insemination
In the typical surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate candidate is artificially inseminated with the semen
of another woman's husband. This
process does not require any complex reproductive technology. A
physician's expertise is not essential.
In fact, artificial insemination can be
done at home with a turkey baster.
State laws regulate artificial insemination to varying degrees. 42 In a few
states it is a criminal offense for anyone other than a licensed physician
to perform artificial insemination. 43
The Baby M contract specifically
provided that the surrogate would
be "artificially inseminated with the
semen of the natural father by a
physician. "44 Although contracts
may vary as to the role of screening
and evaluation at the pre-conception
stage, it is clear that the physician
takes a role in beginning the conception process. Prior to each attempt,
the sperm donor and the surrogate
should be screened for sexually
transmitted diseases. As in the Baby
M case, insemination may be tried a
number of times before conception
occurs.
The health care professional's involvement is necessary for the surrogacy contract to proceed (assuming
the parties reject the at-home turkey-baster method and sexual intercourse}. The physician benefits financially from this process. He or
she is paid a fee for this service and
may have contracted with the surra-

gate agency to inseminate and screen
all surrogates. Does the inseminating
physician also have a physicianpatient relationship with the surrogate and the natural father, or is this
strictly a business relationship with
the surrogacy agency?
Prenatal Care
Once insemination is successful and
conception occurs, the contract may
provide for a continuing role for the
inseminating physician. How does
the surrogacy contract shape medical decision-making, and how does
it affect the health care professional?
The Baby M contract set out a
number of specific terms related to
prenatal care. First, Ms. Whitehead
agreed not to abort unless, "in the
professional medical opinion of the
inseminating physician" it was necessary for her "physical health" or
the child had been found to be
"physiologically abnormal." Furthermore, "upon the request" of the
inseminating physician, she would
agree to "undergo amniocentesis or
similar tests to detect genetic and
congenital defects. "45
These provisions place all the decision-making authority with the inseminating physician. What relationship does this physician have to
the surrogate? What role does her
independent obstetrician have in her
care? To what extent does the inseminating physician know of her
physical health-and what about
her emotional health? Does the inseminating physician take orders
from the surrogate agency and/or
those who pay his or her fee? Will
the profit motive "get the best of"
the physician under these circumstances? In spite of the contract, it
was Mr. Stern's wife, a physician
herself, who insisted that Ms.
Whitehead undergo amniocentesis.
The actual role of any other physician is unknown from the record. 4 6
The Baby M contract provided
that the surrogate would receive no
compensation if she miscarried prior

to the fifth month. 47 What if an ordered amniocentesis had brought
about a miscarriage? Who would
have the cause of action against
which physician? If the baby had
been stillborn subsequent to the
fourth month, Ms. Whitehead
would have received only $ 1 ,ooo. 48
Would the surrogate and the natural
father have a cause of action against
the physician for negligence if they
could prove the physician caused the
stillbirth? Could the mother sue for
the difference of the $g,ooo and her
expenses? Could the father sue for
all his expenses? Obviously, if the
contract is unenforceable, the con- .
tract remedy would not be available;
but what about a potential negligence case? Could all parties establish a duty of the professional to
provide a perfect, final "product"?
The Baby M contract did provide that if prenatal testing revealed
any defects, the surrogate, "upon
demand" of Mr. Stern, would abort
the fetus or forfeit the money.49
Even the trial court determined that
this provision was clearly void and
unenforceable.so Relying on Roe v.
Wade,5' it found "[t]hat only the
woman has the constitutionally protected right to determine the manner
in which her body and person shall
be used." 52
In anori}er contract provision ignored by both courts, the surrogate
would agree "to adhere to all medical instructions given to her by the
inseminating physician as well as her
independent obstetrician."53 But
what if there had been a conflict between the physicians? Was Ms.
Whitehead the patient of both
physicians? 54 Did she have a relationship only with her independent
physician? And if so, why should the
inseminating physician have a role
in her prenatal care? Because the
contract said so? And which physician's instructions was she to consider?
The contract further set out that
Ms. Whitehead was not to "smoke
cigarettes, drink alcoholic bever-
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ages, use illegal drugs, or take nonprescription medications or prescribed medications without written
consent from her physician. " 5 5
Which physician was this? What if
she had told her "independent" physician that she had been drinking or
smoking cigarettes in violation of
the contract? And what if she had
missed a scheduled appointment as
set out in the contract? Was her physician supposed to write these facts
in the chart because they are medically relevant, or should he or she
not put such facts in her record because they violate the contract?
Should the physician report compliance or lack thereof to anyone else?
Should a copy of the contract and its
terms be placed in the surrogate's
medical record? What if she gives
the contract to her physician or the
surrogate agency sends it to him or
her? Should the physician-whose
interest is in protecting the welfare
of the patient and the fetus5 6ignore the contract and act as if it
doesn't exist?
Since her "independent obstetrician" is not part of the business
deal, maybe the surrogate will not
tell this physician about the contract. Does she have a reason to
"deceive" her doctor? Would the
doctor and the staff treat her differently? Her physician might be better
off not knowing about the terms of
the contract and its "rules" on medical decision-making. It certainly
would make the situation less complicated. Yet this information may
be relevant to her prenatal care.
What if her blood pressure began to
rise? Such a reaction could be due to
the ambivalence she feels about giving up the child--or maybe she fears
that if she refuses to give up the child
she will be sued. And what about the
stress that her husband may feel
about her pregnancy? 11aybe her
children are pressuring her not to
give up the baby. Shouldn't her physician have this information? The
physician may believe that the stress
of the arrangement is causing psy-
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chological and potential physical
harm to the mother and the fetus.
With this information, what should
the physician do? Should he or she
order counseling to reduce the
mother's feelings of stress and bonding, or should counseling be directed
toward validating her "natural"
feelings about not wanting to relinquish the child-the possible position of the Baby M court?
What benefits the surrogate
medically may not benefit her financially if she refuses to relinquish the
baby. Is this a risk the surrogate assumes? Should the natural father
pay all these expenses as foreseeable
under the arrangement, whether or
not the mother decides to keep the
baby? The Baby 11 contract provided that the natural father should
pay all expenses "not covered or allowed by her present health and major medical insurance, including all
extraordinary medical expenses and
all reasonable expenses for treatment of any emotional or mental
conditions or problems related to
said pregnancy." 57 What is deemed
"reasonable" expenses for "emotional problems"? Who makes this
determination? If counseling results
in the surrogate's decision not to relinquish the child, is the surrogate
financially liable? If the natural father pays, does he have a role in directing the medical and psychological care provided? In the end, it may
be the physician who ultimately determines the "success" of the surrogacy deal for all the parties. The
health care professional will be
forced to balance the patient's needs
with financial, legal, and ethical uncertainties.

The Birth
When Baby M was born, no one on
the hospital staff appeared to know
that the baby was the "product" of a
surrogate contract. The court described the following scene:
Not wishing anyone at the hosliS

pita! to be aware of the surrogacy arrangement, Mr. and
11rs. Whitehead appeared to all
u~e proud parents of a healthy
female child.... In accordance
with Mrs. Whitehead's request,
the Sterns visited the hospital
unobtrusively to see the newborn child. 5 8
Contrary to a specific provision in
the contract, 59 Ms. Whitehead
named the child Sara Elizabeth
Whitehead on the birth certificate
and Mr. Whitehead was named as
the father. 60 In short, the hospital
staff had been deceived.
But what if the facts had been
different? What if the hospital staff
had known of the arrangement and
the mother appeared to have a conflict about relinquishing the baby?
Should the physician or nurse have
let the mother hold or nurse the
baby? Such action might encourage
even more bonding or attachmentsomething not agreed to in the contract, but standard practice. In fact,
some proposed surrogate contracts
provide that the surrogate not
breast-feed following the birth. And
who would take the baby home at
the time of discharge? Without a
court order or formal proof of relinquishment for adoption, most hospitals would re1ease a child only to
the natural mother. Hospital policy
and fear of liability would not allow
otherwise.
Furthermore, what if the baby
had not been born healthy? Which
parent would be granting consentor denying it-for immediate medical care? If Baby M had needed medical care, the hospital staff would
have sought the consent from Mr.
and 11s. Whitehead. They did not
know that the natural father was
Mr. Stern. The Whiteheads appeared to be the legal guardians at
the time of birth. But what if there
had been a conflict about medical
care? Or what if the baby had been
deformed and no one wanted to take
responsibility? The physician could
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have been forced--as one doctor
was in a 1983 case--to get a court
order to treat the medical problems
of a child born with microcephaly. 6 '
The disappointment of having a less
than perfect child is hard for any
parent to accept. It is also one of the
most difficult problems for the physician to work out with parents. In
fact, hospital ethics committees have
been formed to assist the medical
staff and family make complex ethical and medical decisions about
treatment for severely defective newborns. To further complicate matters, the physician and the hospital
staff would have to figure out which
possible parent speaks on behalf of
the best interests of the child.
There have been a few failed attempts to regulate decision-making
at the time a surrogate mother gives
birth. Some proposals would give
authority to the natural mother
through birth and immediately
thereafter, 62 while others would
shift authority at the time of viability to the natural father and his
wife. 6 3 For the physician and the
hospital staff, it seems safest to place
these decisions with the natural
mother, assuming that she is acting
in the best interests of the child. But
what if the natural mother then relinquishes the less than perfect baby
to the natural father, pursuant to the
contract? He may not want the
"damaged goods" either; the child
could be abandoned by all parties. 6 4
In a recent case reported in the New
England Journal of Medicine, a surrogate mother passed HIV infection
to the fetus. Neither the surrogate
nor the natural father wanted custody of the infant. 6 5
Even if a natural father is
granted custody, he may not have
had a role in the medical decisionmaking process at birth. The physician may not have known of the surrogacy arrangement. Faced with
significant medical and related expenses for his defective child, the father, having had no input into the
medical decisions involved, may

look for a "deep pocket" to sue.
Both the health care professional
and the hospital will face an increasing risk of liability from all parties.

Conclusion

Baby M was not a case about health
care professionals. Yet examination
of the surrogacy contract reveals the
importance of the health care professional as a player in the process.
From the initial evaluation of the
surrogate mother through the birth
of the contracted-for child, health
care professionals face a number of
complex legal and ethical questions.
Many of these questions have no answers. If state legislatures begin to
regulate surrogacy, health care professionals will be expected to assume
an increasing role as "guarantors"
in the process. This is a role that the
health care professional should not
accept without a clear recognition of
the inevitable conflicts.
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